Abstract-A wireless sensor network designed for distributed detection undergoes a Byzantine attack in which a fraction of sensors cooperatively transmit fictitious signals to impair the detection capability of the fusion center. The optimal attacking distributions are derived and the fundamental tradeoff between detection power (best asymptotic exponent of the miss detection error probability) and the attacking power (fraction of compromised sensors) is characterized.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a large Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) engaged in the task of distributed binary detection. The network consists of n nodes or sensors, each making an independent and identically distributed (iid) observation about the State of the Nature (say '1I or 'HO). These observations are successively delivered to a common fusion center (parallel architecture) for the final decision on the underlying statistical hypothesis. Actually the network is under attack: a clique of traitorous sensors cooperatively works against the network. These sensors, referred to as the Byzantines (and the kind of attack described is then called Byzantine attack [1] ), deliver data according to certain fictitious distributions properly designed in order to impair the detection capability of the fusion center. The Byzantines are assumed to know the true underlying hypothesis; the uninfected and FC, obviously, do not. The fusion center, however, is aware of the presence of the Byzantines. Specifically, it knows that a fraction a of the sensors are traitorous and will deliver data drawn according to the optimal (from the Byzantine viewpoint) attacking distributions. As a consequence, the decision rule implemented at the fusion center is a Neyman-Pearson test that do account for the fraction of fictitious data. The addressed problem is schematically depicted in Fig. 1 described strategy is more sophisticated than the naivest blackhole attack, in which the intruder simply destroys the owned fraction of sensors.
In the above we implicitly referred to a network where each node makes a single observation about the State of the Nature. Also considered in this work is a hierarchical network in which m individual sensors form a cluster, and there are n different clusters. In this scenario, either all the m sensors of a cluster are Byzantine or all are honest, and the sensors shown in Fig. 1 become clusters of sensors, with each cluster delivering to the fusion center a vector of m samples.
In the two described system architectures we address the following basic questions. What are the optimal attacking distributions that the Byzantine will employ? What is the resulting test performance? What about the minimum fraction 1-4244-0785-0/06/$20.00 of traitorous sensors/clusters such that the network becomes useless?
General network security is widely considered in the literature, see e.g., [2] , while less investigated is the the topic of secure sensor networks for distributed detection and data fusion [3] - [5] . Relevant to our approach are also [6] - [8] . For an entry point to the notion of the Byzantine general problem see [1] . A related information theoretical view of Byzantine attacks in wireless sensor networks is provided in [9] , where the focus is on the capacity of collaborative fusion. The presence of misinformed nodes is instead dealt with in [10] .
The 1 -1}, and p q, x and y are probability mass functions defined over A.
The Byzantine sensors deliver to the FC fictitious samples drawn iid from suitably chosen attacking distributions x and y in the attempt of worsening the network performance. As our focus is on large sensor networks, this latter is here measured in terms of the Kullback-Leibler divergence D(z w); we also use the symbol d(y; x) to denote such a divergence, where the dependence on the attacking distributions is emphasized. The fusion center collects the nodes observations, with no possibility of distinguishing between fair and fictitious, and finally implements a Neyman-Pearson test between the actual pmfs w and z, being aware of the presence of the Byzantines.
The final exponent of the test (asymptotic miss detection error rate) will be the minimum of the divergence between the two hypotheses (ii) If a = ab, then the unique pair of distributions (x, y) that nullifies the test exponent is, Vk E A,
If a > ab, there exist infinitely many solutions (x, y) that nullifies the test exponent. These are obtained by starting with Xk = a (qk-Pk)+ (which is not a pmf) and increasing arbitrarily some of the Xk's until x becomes a pmf, the corresponding y is then obtained as Yk = Xk +1 (Pk -qk)- [11] .
Part (i) of the above theorem, along with the condition ab < 1/2, implies that the divergence can be always nullified, provided that the fraction of Byzantine sensors exceeds 50%.
In this case no meaningful inference about the surrounding hypothesis can be made, and we say that the attack has completely blinded the network. The system is useless. Figure 3 gives three examples of applications. We are given the initial distributions p and q and the attack power a. Then, the attacking distributions x and y, can be computed as indicated by Theorem 1. These are depicted in Fig. 3 ; also depicted are the final distributions, used at the fusion center to implement the Neyman-Pearson test. In the first example p and q are such that ab -0.49. If we assume that the intruder power is a = 0.4, the attacking distributions and the final pmfs are as shown in the figure. The divergence between the hypotheses is D(q lp) -8.3178 nats while, as consequence of the attack, the final divergence between z and w reduces to A (a) -6.4 10-2 nats. In the second example the divergence can be nullified. There, in fact, we set a = 0.3, while ab (4) achieving such minimum again corresponds to the hypothesisreversed emission strategy. A Proof: Provided in [11] . Note that part (ii) of the above theorem implies that, differently from the scenario considered in Theorem 1, an attack based on less than 50% of the nodes can never impair the system.
On the other hand, part (iii) tells us that infinitely many observations (per cluster) do not imply error-free decision. At first glance, perhaps one would expect dm(y; x) to scale linearly with the number of local observations m, and therefore d,, (y; x) = oo (error-free, singular test). Instead, there exist attacking distributions x and y such that d, (y; x) < oo. The traitorous Byzantines, obviously, will choose that.
This admits an intuitive explanation. Consider the ensemble of m samples collected by a generic cluster and made available to the FC. Assume further that m is so large that the FC can exactly know whether these samples come from p or from q. For instance, if they are known to be drawn from p then, in view of the reversed emission strategy, this lead to the conclusion that either the true hypothesis is '1I and the cluster is honest (this happens with probability 1-a) or the true hypothesis is 'Ho and the cluster is infected (with probability a). Similarly, if data comes from q, then we either have a honest cluster and 'Ho is true (probability a) or the cluster is infected and 'HI is true (probability 1-a). Exploiting the many clusters of the network, the FC implements a test whose asymptotic miss detection error exponent is just h(a).
Comparing the results of Theorems 1 and 2 in the simple scenario of binary alphabets, we see that by increasing m the optimal attacking distributions move from a deterministic delivering x0 = 1, yo = 0 (which is the best for the case of m = 1, as a simple derivation from eq. (4) reveals) to the asymptotically optimum hypothesis-reversed emission strategy, i.e., xo = qo, yo = po. This is illustrated in Fig. 4 .
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A sensor network designed for distributed detection and subject to a Byzantine attack has been considered, with two system architectures addressed: a network made of individual sensors, and a hierarchical structure with groups of m sensors tied together to form a cluster.
For the former architecture we show that if more than 50% of the nodes are Byzantine, the attack can always destroy any detection capability: the network become useless. Actually this turns out to be true provided that the fraction of traitorous nodes exceeds a quantity that we call the blinding power ab (which is always smaller than or equal to 1/2).
The fundamental tradeoff between detection capability and attacking power is characterized, the optimal attacking probability laws are derived, and the decision rule implemented at the fusion center turns out to be a censored likelihood ratio test. This bears similarities to Huber's robust statistics.
In the clustered network, this analogy breaks down and different behaviors arise. In fact, attackers owning less than one half of the total sensors cannot completely impair the system. They can, however, severely degrade the performance of the network, and the optimal attacking distributions that achieve this goal are "hypothesis-reversed": the Byzantine emissions are drawn from the distribution corresponding to the false State of the Nature. A remarkable fact is that the asymptotic detection probability does not scale exponentially with the cluster size. Actually, it does not scale at all with m. The practical consequence is a saturation effect: increasing the number of per-cluster sensors beyond a certain amount does not provide any significant performance improvement. On the other hand, the expected scaling law is instead preserved with respect to the total number of clusters.
